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Abstract: 
This paper investigates the relationship between macroeconomic conditions and drinking using 
individual-level data from 1987 to 1999 interview years of the ―behavioral risk factor 
surveillance system‖ (BRFSS). We confirm the procyclical variation in overall drinking 
identified in previous research using aggregate sales data and show that this largely results from 
changes in consumption by existing drinkers, rather than movements into or out of drinking. 
Moreover, the decrease occurring during bad economic times is concentrated among heavy 
consumers, with light drinking actually rising. We also find no evidence that the decline in 
overall alcohol use masks a rise for persons becoming unemployed during contractions. These 
results suggest that any stress-induced increases in drinking during bad economic times are more 
than offset by declines resulting from changes in economic factors such as lower incomes.  
Keywords: Macroeconomic conditions; Behavioral risk factor surveillance system (BRFSS); 
Alcohol consumption 
 
Article: 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Research emphasizing psychological responses to economic downturns predicts that alcohol use 
will rise during these periods as a form of self-medication for stress, with particularly large 
growth in abusive drinking and risky behaviors such as drunk-driving (e.g. Brenner and Mooney, 
1983; Winton et al., 1986; Pierce et al., 1994). However, the causal effects of macroeconomic 
conditions are actually more complicated. A separate psychological literature emphasizes the 
role ofjob stress (e.g. Baker, 1985; Karasek and Theorell, 1990; Fenwick and Tausig, 1994; 
Sokejima and Kagamimori, 1998), implying that drinking may increase with the intensity of 
employment. Previous research also indicates that consumption is positively related to incomes 
(e.g. Skog, 1986; Sloan et al., 1995; Ruhm, 1995). Thus, stress-induced drinking during 
depressed periods might be partially or fully offset by reductions due to decreased earnings. The 
costs of drinking may also rise for employed persons fearing job loss. Conversely, the 
opportunity cost of alcohol use might fall if the negative consequences of intoxication during the 
work-day are reduced due to declining work hours or increased unemployment. Finally, drinking 
patterns could differ across groups. For instance, employed individuals might drink less while 
alcohol problems increase among the newly unemployed (Catalano et al., 1993). 
 
This paper analyzes the relationship between economic conditions and drinking using individual-
level data from the ―behavioral risk factor surveillance system‖ (BRFSS). Several features make 
this study unique. First, we consider a wider range of outcomes than in previous research, 
including differences in the responsiveness of ―light‖ and ―heavy‖ drinkers. Second, we examine 
the dynamics of the adjustment of alcohol use to changes in macroeconomic conditions. Third, 
we explore whether the cyclical fluctuations differ across population subgroups stratified by sex, 
race/ethnicity, age, and employment status. 
 
Our investigation confirms the procyclical variation in overall drinking identified in previous 
research. In addition, we show that almost all of the fluctuation results from changes in 
consumption for existing drinkers, instead of entry into or exit from alcohol use. In fact, 
decreased drinking during bad times is dominated by reductions in heavy rather than recreational 
drinking. Although the strength of the macroeconomic variations differ across demographic 
groups, these patterns appear fairly universal. Finally, we uncover no evidence that drinking 
increases among persons becoming newly unemployed during bad economic times. 
 
2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
Considerable research examines how alcohol use is affected by taxes or prices, minimum legal 
drinking ages, restrictions on availability, and laws aimed at reducing drunk-driving.
1
 By 
contrast, macroeconomic conditions have received less attention. Ruhm (1995) investigates how 
these are related to alcohol consumption and highway vehicle fatalities using aggregate data for 
the 48 contiguous states over the 1975–1988 period. The primary finding is that drinking and 
vehicle mortality vary procyclically.
2
 One reason is because incomes grow when the economy 
expands and alcohol is a normal good. Freeman (1999) raises concern that the data used by 
Ruhm may be non-stationary. Nevertheless, using an expanded data set (covering the 50 states 
and District of Columbia for the 1970–1995 period) that is rendered stationary by using growth 
rates instead of levels, he confirms the procyclical pattern of alcohol consumption.
3
 
 
The use of aggregate data in these studies introduces several complications. First, the set of 
covariates controlled for is generally limited, although this shortcoming is partially surmounted 
by estimating fixed-effect models, which automatically account for time-invariant factors. 
Second, it is difficult to ascertain individual behavior; this is often referred to as the ―ecological  
 
1. US Department of Health and Human Services (2000) provides a useful recent literature 
review on price elasticities and alcohol taxation. The effects of availability constraints and minimum 
drinking ages are discussed in Gruenewald (1993) and Wagenaar (1993). Cook and Moore (2000) 
provide an excellent overview of economic research related to alcohol. 
2. For example, a 1 standard deviation (2.12 percentage point) increase in the state 
unemployment rate is predicted to reduce drinking by 1.3 % and traffic fatalities by almost 7%. The 
consumption of distilled spirits is more sensitive to macroeconomic conditions than purchases of beer or 
wine. These results are consistent with earlier research findings by O’Neill (1984) and Evans and 
Graham (1988) indicating that vehicle fatalities and single vehicle night-time crashes (which frequently 
involve drunk-driving) are procyclical and those of Wagenaar and Streff (1989) suggesting that alcohol 
consumption increases in good times. 
3. Freeman finds that the failure to correct for non-stationarity yields parameter estimates that 
are sensitive to the choice of time periods; however, this may be an artifact of the data he uses. Whereas 
Ruhm transforms beer, wine, and distilled spirits consumption into ethanol-equivalents using constant 
conversion rates, Freeman use information from the ―alcohol epidemiologic data system‖ (AEDS) where 
the conversion factors vary over time—wine is assumed contain 16.0% alcohol prior to 1972,14.5% from 
1972 to 1976, and 12.9% after 1976, and distilled spirits 45.0%, 43.0%, and 41.1% alcohol in the three 
periods. These sharp discontinuities could render Freeman’s data non-stationary. 
inference‖ problem. For example, overall alcohol consumption might fall during recessions 
because of decreases among recreational users, even while heavy drinking increases. Since 
moderate alcohol use has recently been linked to health benefits (e.g. Gaziano et al., 1993; Thun 
et al., 1997) and drinking problems are likely to be concentrated among those imbibing large 
amounts, reductions in total use could therefore mask increased alcohol abuse.
4
 Similarly, 
consumption might decline in bad times because workers drink less, even while persons 
becoming newly unemployed raise their intake. Such a pattern might help to reconcile the 
psychological literature emphasizing drinking as self-medication for stress with an overall 
procyclical pattern of alcohol use.
5
 Third, potential differences across sex, race/ethnicity, or age 
groups cannot be identified using sales data. Cross-border purchases, illegal production, 
breakage, and untaxed alcohol from abroad are also not accounted for. 
 
These shortcomings indicate that much can be gained by investigating the relationship between 
economic conditions and drinking with microdata. The few previous studies doing so yield 
inconclusive results. Ettner’s (1997) analysis of the 1988 National Health Interview Survey 
concludes that alcohol consumption and dependence are procyclical but with mixed effects of 
involuntary unemployment—it is associated with more drinking but less alcohol dependence. 
Moreover, Ettner’s use of cross-sectional data implies that the impact of economic conditions 
may be confounded with unobserved determinants of drinking that vary across states.
6
 
 
Dee (2001) avoids some of these problems by estimating fixed-effect models using data from 
1984 to 1995 period of the BRFSS. He obtains the contradictory result that economic downturns 
are associated with reductions in overall drinking and in the probability of consuming 60 or more 
drinks per month but also with a higher likelihood of consuming five or more drinks on a single 
occasion. There are several possible explanations for these inconsistencies. First, early waves of 
the BRFSS contain data for relatively few states (only 15 in 1984), which is problematic for 
fixed-effect specifications that exploit within-state variations. This shortcoming becomes even 
more severe since year (as well as state) dummy variables are included in his models, although 
doing so removes most of the sample variation in unemployment. We elaborate on this point in 
the following sections. Second, the data are not weighted to account for differences in sampling 
probabilities, even though the BRFSS is only nationally representative after weighting and there 
are sharp differences in drinking behavior across demographic groups. Third, the set of  
 
4. Some empirical evidence supports the possibility of differential responses for light and heavy 
drinkers. Manning et al. (1995) find that the price elasticity of demand for alcohol is fairly high for 
recreational drinkers but approximately zero for the heaviest consumers. Kenkel (1996) indicates lower 
price elasticities for heavy than moderate alcohol users, particularly for those who are poorly informed 
about the related health risks. On the other hand, Cook and Tauchen (1982) show that cirrhosis 
mortality, which disproportionately affects heavy drinkers, is a declining function of alcohol taxes, 
indicating that even these individuals are price sensitive. 
5. Feather (1990) provides an excellent review of the literature on the relationship between 
employment, joblessness, and psychological well-being. Theodossiou (1998) supplies an example of 
recent economic research on this topic. 
6. Ettner sometimes uses state unemployment rates to instrument individual labor market status. 
However, this approach is only valid if economic conditions influence drinking exclusively through their 
impact on employment. Evidence presented below casts doubt on this. 
 
explanatory variables included is quite limited. For instance, Dee does not control for alcohol 
taxes or prices and most specifications exclude information on education or marital status.
7
 
 
We improve on prior research in several ways. First, our analysis of the BRFSS data covers a 
longer (and more recent) period. Second, we consider a broader array of outcomes, paying 
particular attention to the distinction between recreational drinking and heavy use. Third, we 
investigate the dynamics of the adjustment to sustained changes in macroeconomic conditions. 
Fourth, we offer a more complete examination of differences in drinking behavior on the basis of 
age, sex, race/ethnicity, and employment status.
8
 
 
3. DATA AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS 
Data are from 1987 to 1999 interview years of the BRFSS. The BRFSS, administered by the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, is an annual telephone survey of the non-
institutionalized adult population designed to produce uniform state-specific data on preventive 
health practices and risky behaviors, including alcohol use and abuse. One goal of the survey is 
to enable public health professionals to monitor state and national progress towards meeting the 
Healthy People 2010: National Health Promotion and Disease Prevention Objectives. Only 15 
states participated in the BRFSS in its first year (1984) but 34 states did so by 1987 and 45 or 
more in each year of the 1990s. Sample sizes are large, exceeding 50,0000 (sic) in each year we 
analyze, and increase over time so that our 13 years sample contains over one million 
observations. Information on alcohol use is available for all respondents except in 1994, 1996, 
and 1998, when these questions are in optional modules included by 12, 17, and 12 states 
(covering 22,046, 42,424, and 32,472 individuals). Further information on the BRFSS can be 
obtained from http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/brfss. 
 
The BRFSS, while extremely useful, does contain several limitations. First, since the data are 
obtained from telephone surveys of residential households, persons without phones or whose 
abode is non-residential (e.g. military bases, college dorms, or institutions) are excluded. Second, 
no information is provided on youths (under the age of 18). Third, alcohol use is likely to be 
understated in self-reported data (Midanik,1982); however, the self-report errors appear to be 
consistent over time (Johnston et al., 1992) and the estimates will only be biased if the 
underreporting systematically differs with economic conditions. 
 
3.1. Dependent variables 
The BRFSS collects various information on alcohol use. Respondents are asked whether they 
had at least one drink of any alcoholic beverage (i.e. one can/bottle of beer or wine coolers, one 
glass of wine, one cocktail, or one shot of liquor) during the prior month. Those answering in the 
affirmative are questioned about the number of drinks, whether they had more than five drinks 
on a single occasion, and if they had driven after having ―had perhaps too much to drink‖. Using 
these data, we created several measures of alcohol use in the last month. ―Drinking participation‖ 
has a value of one (zero) for persons with some (no) consumption. ―Conditional drinking‖  
 
7. Ruhm’s (2000) preliminary analysis of BRFSS data for the 1987–1995 period suggests a 
countercyclical variation in alcohol consumption but suffers from many of these same shortcomings. 
8. Dee (2001) provides a limited investigation of demographic group differences in binge 
drinking. 
 
indicates the number of alcoholic beverages imbibed by drinkers. ―Alcohol-involved driving‖ is 
a dummy variable set to one for persons who have driven when they have ―had perhaps too much 
to drink‖. Dummy variables for conditional drinking in the ranges of 1–10, 1–20, 21–59, ≥ 60 
and ≥  100 alcoholic beverages are used to distinguish between different levels of drinking. 
Finally, ―binge drinking‖ is a binary outcome indicating whether consumers had imbibed five or 
more beverages on a single occasion. 
 
The distinction between drinking participation and conditional drinking is common in health 
applications because the process distinguishing some versus no use is frequently distinct from 
that generating alternative positive values (Mullahy,1998). In this formulation, expected 
consumption for individual i with characteristics X is determined by 
 
E[Yi|Xi] =Pr[Yi > 0|Xi] × E[Yi|Yi > 0, Xi]  
 
where Y is the number of drinks per month, E(·) and Pr(·) indicate conditional expectations and 
probabilities, and the first (second) term on the right-hand side of (1) refers to drinking 
participation (conditional drinking). As is conventional, we assume that the natural log of 
conditional drinking is linearly related to the explanatory variables according to for   the 
 
E[ln(Yi)|Y > 0, Xi] = Xi   
 
vector of regression coefficients. We similarly estimate conditional probabilities of light, 
moderate, heavy, or binge drinking after restricting the sample to alcohol users. 
 
A small number of respondents report extremely high (and presumably erroneous) levels of 
consumption. To avoid assigning these outliers undue influence, we censor conditional drinking 
at 450 drinks per month (15 drinks per day). This affects <0.02% of the sample and the results 
are not sensitive to using other criteria for top-coding. Information on drinking participation is 
unavailable for 0.2% of the sample (2150 individuals), with additional missing values for the 
other outcomes.
9
 There does not appear to be a consistent pattern of non-response for conditional 
drinking, but missing values for alcohol-involved driving and binge drinking are concentrated 
among heavy consumers. However, there is no indication that non-response biases the parameter 
estimates for the variables of key interest.
10
 
 
3.2. Explanatory variables 
Our main proxy for macroeconomic conditions is the survey month state unemployment rate for 
the civilian non-institutionalized population (aged 16 years and over). Data are from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) Database at the web-site: 
http://stats.bls.gov/lauhome.htm. Some regressions also control for the national unemployment 
 
9. This includes 21,874 persons for whom there is insufficient information to construct the 
number of drinks consumed, and 2791 and 7778 individuals not reporting on alcohol-involved driving or 
binge drinking. 
10. We tested for this by examining whether the parameter estimates changed substantially when 
observations with missing values were added to the sample and assigned various possible values (e.g. a 
zero or one in alternative regression estimates for the dichotomous variables). 
 
(1) 
(2) 
 
 
rate. Others include lagged unemployment rates or hold constant annual state per capita personal 
income (obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis web-site: 
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/spi), converted to thousands of 1999 US$ using the all-
items consumer price index. 
 
The econometric models also control for a quadratic in years of age and dummy variables for 
sex, education (high school dropout, some college, college graduate), race/ethnicity (non-
Hispanic black, other non-Hispanic non-white, Hispanic origin), marital status (married, 
divorced/separated, widowed), as well as interactions between age, sex, and race/ethnicity. 
Finally, the sum of the state and federal taxes (in 1999 US$) on a case of beer (24–12 ounce cans 
or bottles) is held constant, using data from various issues of the US Brewers’ Association 
Brewer’s Almanac and the Federation of Tax Administrators web-site 
(http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/beer.html). Information on one or more demographic 
characteristic is not reported for 0.8% of respondents (8298 persons). To avoid excluding these 
individuals, the relevant regressor was set to zero and missing value dummy variables were 
created. 
 
3.3. Descriptive information 
Table 1 presents sample means for selected variables. The first column shows averages for the 
raw data; the second weights observations using BRFSS final sampling weights.
11
 Males, young 
adults, minorities, Hispanics, and currently married individuals are underrepresented in the raw 
data. Since drinking behavior differs substantially across population groups, analysis of 
unweighted data may therefore provide unreliable estimates of the average ―treatment-effect‖. As 
a result, sampling weights are incorporated in most of the econometric analysis. 
 
Drinking is highly concentrated. Just over half of adults imbibed alcohol in the last month and 
those doing so averaged around 21 drinks. However, 50% of consumers had fewer than 10 drinks 
and 75% less than 25, while only 5% imbibed 80 or more alcoholic beverages. Similarly, fewer 
than 3% of adults claim to have driven after ―perhaps having had too much to drink‖. 
Conversely, those drinking 25 (80) or more beverages during the prior month accounted for 70% 
(30%) of total alcohol consumption. 
 
Fig. 1 displays the pattern of average unemployment rates and alcohol consumption using 
quarterly data obtained by taking weighted averages over three-month periods and normalizing 
by subtracting the sample mean and dividing by the standard deviation. The figure thus shows 
fluctuations in terms of standard deviations from the mean. Two points are noteworthy. First, 
drinking was at relatively low levels during the bad economic times of the early-1990s, 
suggesting that alcohol use is procyclical. However, since other factors could have changed 
simultaneously (e.g. the federal beer tax was doubled in 1991), a multivariate analysis is needed 
to confirm this. Second, unemployment and alcohol consumption both trended down over the 
sample period. The decline in joblessness resulted from the economic expansion of the middle 
and late-1990s. The fall in drinking reflects a secular trend whereby per capita ethanol 
 
11. Weighted estimates from the BRFSS are comparable to those for in person surveys 
(Remington et al., 1988). 
 
 
consumption declined 21 %between 1981 and 1997 (Nephew et al., 1999). It, therefore, is 
presumably not causally related to recent reductions in unemployment. This is dealt with in the 
empirical analysis by including a vector of state-specific time trends. 
 
3.4. Econometric methods 
The basic econometric specification is 
 
Yijmt = α j + Xijmtβ + Emjtγ + δm + εijmt  
 
where Y is the alcohol outcome for individual i living in state j interviewed in month m of year t, 
X the vector of covariates (individual characteristics and beer taxes), E the measure of local 
(3) 
 
economic conditions, ε the regression disturbance, and α and δ represent unobserved 
determinants of alcohol use associated with the state and survey month. 
 
The month-effects control for seasonal variations in drinking and the state fixed- effect holds 
constant time-invariant determinants that differ across locations. The impact of the 
macroeconomic fluctuations is therefore identified by within-state variations in economic 
conditions, relative to changes occurring in other states. Most models also include state-specific 
linear time trends (αj × × Tmt), registering months elapsed since January 1987, to control for 
factors that vary over time within-states, implying the regression equation 
 
Yijmt = α j + Xijmtβ + Emjtγ + δm + α j Tmtλ + εijmt  
 
For ease of interpretation, the results of linear probability models are usually presented for the 
dichotomous outcomes. Very similar predicted effects are obtained from corresponding binary 
probit estimates. The Huber–White sandwich estimator is used to calculate robust S.E., assuming 
that observations are independent across states and months but not within-states in a given 
calendar month. This is done because unemployment rates are the same for all observations in a 
given state–month–year cell. The reported S.E. are typically 0–35% larger than those obtained 
assuming that all observations are independent. 
 
4. DRINKING IS PROCYCLICAL 
Table 2 summarizes alternative econometric estimates of the effect of a one percentage point 
increase in the state unemployment rate on drinking participation, conditional drinking, and 
alcohol-involved driving. One percentage point corresponds to a 17% (0.62 standard deviation) 
change from the sample mean of 5.85%. The first three columns differ according to whether or 
not they include state-specific time trends or weight the data. All specifications also control for 
individual characteristics, beer taxes, month dummy variables, and state fixed-effects. The 
parameter estimates for the supplementary regressors (not shown) are consistent with those 
obtained in previous research. Females, minorities, and married persons drink relatively little; 
college graduates have high rates of drinking participation but consume moderate amounts and 
seldom engage in alcohol-involved driving, and beer taxes are negatively correlated with alcohol 
use. 
 
The data consistently indicate that drinking participation is insensitive to macroeconomic 
conditions, while conditional drinking exhibits a sharp procyclical variation and drunk-driving 
appears to become less common in bad times. The model we prefer and will focus on throughout 
the remainder of the paper, because it includes state-specific trends and sampling weights, is 
shown in column (c).
12
 In this case, a one point rise in unemployment reduces predicted drinking 
participation, conditional drinking, and alcohol-involved driving by 0.3%,3.1%, and 3.3%.13 
 
12. Weighting reduces efficiency if sampling is based on exogenous variables and the conditional 
distribution is correctly specified (Wooldridge, 1999; Butler, 2000). However, these conditions do not hold for 
the BRFSS (e.g. because men drink more than women and are underrepresented), implying that weighting is 
likely to be required to obtain consistent estimates of the average treatment-effect. 
13. Percentage changes in drinking participation and alcohol-involved driving are calculated at the 
sample mean values (52.1% and 2.7%). Virtually identical estimates are obtained when deleting from the 
sample the 3 years (1994, 1996, and 1998) where the alcohol questions are included only in optional modules. 
(4) 
 
Specification (d) adds a vector of year dummy variables to the model. Unfortunately, doing so 
absorbs much of the remaining variation in state unemployment rates, so it is no surprise that the 
predicted impacts of macroeconomy are substantially attenuated: by almost one-half for alcohol-
involved driving and over two-thirds for conditional drinking.
14
 The key issue is that, even with 
13 years of data, fluctuations in state economic conditions are largely accounted for by the 
combination of general year effects (which capture the effects of the national economy and other 
factors changing uniformly across states over time), fixed-effects, and state-specific secular 
trends. However, the point estimates continue to suggest a procyclical variation in drinking. The 
remaining analysis focuses on models without year dummy variables. We believe this to be the 
most reasonable procedure, since the general time effects account for so much of the residual 
variation. Nevertheless, we recognize that an ideal data source would contain sufficient 
independent local fluctuations to make this exclusion unnecessary. 
 
Binary probit models are used for the two dichotomous outcomes (drinking participation and 
alcohol-involved driving) in column (e). The resulting predicted effects, calculated with other 
explanatory variables than unemployment evaluated at the sample means, are very close to the 
corresponding linear probability model estimates. Thus, little is lost by not explicitly accounting 
for the discrete nature of these dependent variables. 
 
The estimates in specification (f) use state-level aggregates, constructed by calculating average 
values for each state–year cell from the (weighted) BRFSS data. The alcohol outcome is then 
regressed on unemployment rates, beer taxes, state fixed-effects, and state-specific time trends, 
with observations weighted by the square root of the adult population in the state. These models 
approximately correspond to previous research (e.g. Ruhm, 1995; Freeman, 1999) examining the 
macroeconomic variation in state alcohol sales or traffic fatalities using aggregate data. Our 
findings once again indicate a procyclical pattern of conditional drinking and possibly drunk-
driving combined with little change in drinking participation, suggesting that individual and 
aggregate data yield consistent predictions. 
 
Table 3 provides additional findings. The first column repeats the results of the preferred model 
from Table 2. The next two specifications separately control for monthly national unemployment 
rates and average survey year per state capita incomes. Coefficients on the US unemployment 
rate proxy the effects of national (rather than local) economic conditions. However, since 
joblessness trended down during this period and there is only one turning point in the data (the 
early-1990s), the parameter estimates will be biased if important omitted variables follow similar 
patterns.
15
 Noting this caveat, specification (b) suggests that national downturns are associated 
with larger reductions in drinking than corresponding deteriorations in state economic 
conditions. A one point rise in the US unemployment rate decreases predicted conditional 
drinking by over 6%, drinking participation by 1.6 percentage points (3.1%), and alcohol-
involved driving by 0.15 points (5.6%); the same rise in state joblessness (controlling for the  
 
14. The year variables eliminate 60.3% of the variation in unemployment rates remaining after 
including month dummy variables, state fixed-effects, and state-specific time trends. By contrast, the 
addition of state time-trends absorbed just 27% of the variation remaining after controlling for month 
and state fixed-effects. 
15. This problem is likely to be less severe (but not completely eliminated) when considering state 
unemployment rates, to the extent that state economies fluctuate independently. 
 
national rate) reduces expected conditional drinking by just 1.3% while having no impact on the 
other two outcomes. This raises the possibility that the state-level variations focused upon in this 
analysis understate the reduction in alcohol use occurring during national downturns. 
 
Alcohol consumption falls in bad times partly because incomes decline. In our data, a one point 
rise in the state unemployment rate is associated with a US$ 640 fall in per capita income, 
controlling for state and month effects. As shown in column (c), a US$ 1000 (or 0.28 standard 
deviation) reduction in income, in turn, is expected to decrease conditional drinking by over 5% 
and alcohol-involved driving by more than 4%. These results accord with evidence by Ruhm 
(1995) and others that alcohol use and drunk-driving are normal goods. 
 
To test whether declines in overall drinking mask increased consumption among persons 
entering unemployment, we estimated an augmented regression that included a dummy variable 
for persons reporting being ―out of work for less than 1 year‖, as well as interactions between 
this variable and the state unemployment rate. These specifications provided no indication of 
increased drinking among persons becoming jobless in bad times. Instead, the interaction 
coefficient was almost always negative, suggesting larger procyclical variations in alcohol use 
for recently unemployed individuals than for workers. For instance, a one percentage point 
increase in the state unemployment rate was predicted to reduce the conditional drinking of 
employed 25–55-year-old males by 3.9%, compared to an almost 6% decrease for those out of 
work less than 1 year.
16 
 
16. Changes in the composition of unemployment could account for a portion of the negative interaction 
effect. 
 
5. LIGHT VERSUS HEAVY DRINKING 
The aforementioned findings demonstrate that the macroeconomic variation in alcohol use is 
dominated by changes at the intensive margin (how much drinkers consume) rather than the 
extensive margin (whether they drink at all). We next consider fluctuations in conditional 
drinking by limiting the sample to alcohol users and analyzing dichotomous variables for binge 
drinking and consumption of 1–10, 1–20, 21–59, >60, >100 drinks during the last 30 days. 
 
The 60 drink cut-off is frequently used to delineate ―chronic‖ drinking (e.g. Dee, 2001) and 
corresponds to the threshold between moderate and heavy drinking for males according to 
current federal guidelines (US Department of Agriculture and US Department of Health and 
Human Services, 2000). Only 8% of consumers (4% of sample members) report consuming this 
much alcohol. However, since two drinks per day has been linked to decreased risk of coronary 
heart disease in some studies, we pay particular attention to ―heavy drinking‖ defined by 
consumption of at least 100 alcoholic beverages per month. Fewer than 3% of drinkers imbibe 
this much, implying that this standard captures the upper tail of the distribution of alcohol use. 
Conversely, 1–10 or 1–20 drinks per month are used to represent ―light‖ drinking and 21–59 
beverages to define moderate use.
17
 The final binary outcome, binge drinking, proxied by 
consumption of five or more alcoholic beverages on a single occasion, could occur without 
heavy alcohol use over the course of a month, although this is rare in our data.
18
 
 
The econometric results, displayed in Table 4, demonstrate that drinking falls in bad economic 
times because of reductions in chronic or heavy use. A one point increase in unemployment 
decreases the expected probability of consuming 60 (100) or more drinks by 0.63 (0.28) 
percentage points or 7.8% (9.7%). Small declines in moderate consumption and binge drinking 
are also observed, but there is a statistically significant 2.0% (1.3%) rise in the likelihood of 
imbibing 10 (20) or fewer drinks. Once again a portion of the macroeconomic fluctuation is due 
to changes in incomes; a US$ 1000 reduction is predicted to decrease the probability of reaching 
the 60 (100) drink threshold by 6.8% (1.6%) and to cut binge drinking by 4.7%, while raising the 
frequency of recreational drinking. 
 
These estimates, combined with those above, indicate that alcohol use falls during contractions 
because some drinkers switch from heavy to more moderate levels of consumption, rather than 
because recreational users give up liquor or reduce their intake. Since heavy drinking is 
associated with alcohol abuse and light consumption may have medical benefits, it is almost 
certain that drinking problems become less common in bad times. 
 
6. DYNAMICS 
Economic conditions have been assumed to have only a contemporaneous impact on alcohol use 
until now. Information on the dynamics of the adjustment process is provided in Table 5. Models 
that include 18 months lags of the state unemployment rate are estimated and the predicted 
 
17. Since federal guidelines recommend that women drink no more than one alcoholic beverage 
per day, we also tested specifications using a 30 drink cut-off for females. The results are qualitatively 
similar to those obtained using 60 or 100 drink thresholds. 
18. For instance, binge drinkers consumed almost 4 times as many alcoholic beverages as non-
bingers, were 11 (23) times more likely to imbibe at least 60 (100) drinks per month, and had driven 
under the influence 15 times as often. 
 
 
 
 
impact of a one percentage point rise in joblessness that has been sustained fork months is 
calculated as t-n for t−n the regression coefficient on the n months lag of unemployment. 
 
The adjustment patterns exhibit some instability, leading to imprecise estimates. Two patterns 
nevertheless emerge. First, a sustained rise in joblessness is associated with a short-lasting 
reduction in drinking participation. A persistent one point increase in unemployment reduces 
expected drinking participation by 1.3, 1.3, 0.9, and 0.5 percentage points (2.6%, 2.6%, 1.8%, 
0.9%) after 0, 3, 6, and 9 months but is associated with small and statistically insignificant 
changes beyond 1 year.
19
 The decline in alcohol-involved driving also appears temporary, with 
negative impacts expected in most of the first 9 months but essentially no subsequent effect. 
Second, there are long-lasting changes in alcohol use at the intensive margin. Conditional 
drinking is anticipated to fall 3.4%, 3.7%, 6.0%, and 5.0% after 0, 3, 9, and 15 months, and 
heavy consumption (100 or more drinks) by 0.4%, 0.4%, 0.6%, and 0.4 percentage points 
(14.1%, 12.8%, 21.7%, 14.1%). It is noteworthy that we uncover no evidence of larger 
permanent than transitory effects, contrary to the predictions of Becker and Murphy’s (1988) 
theory of rational addiction. 
 
19. Similar evidence of larger short-run than long-run changes in alcohol consumption has been obtained 
by previous researchers examining the effects of treatment programs (Humphreys et al., 1997), divorce 
(Hartford et al., 1994), DUI-legislation (Ross, 1984), and the privatization of alcohol sales (Mulford et 
al., 1992). 
7. Population subgroups 
We next test for differences across population groups. Table 6 shows that males drink much 
more than females, consumption falls with age, and non-Hispanic minorities consume relatively 
little alcohol. These patterns are consistent with the findings of other research (e.g. see US 
Department of Health and Human Services, 1997). The econometric results summarized in Table 
7 confirm a strong procyclical variation in conditional drinking and heavy consumption for most 
subgroups, with weaker impacts for drinking participation and alcohol-involved driving. One 
exception is that nonwhites and senior citizens are more likely than others to stop drinking 
during economic downturns. The large cyclical variation in alcohol use by Hispanics is also 
noteworthy and may be explained by specific employment patterns (e.g. the high representation 
of Hispanics in agricultural jobs) or cultural considerations. For instance, Hispanics often 
consume alcohol as a reward for hard work (Heath, 1995; Ames and Rebhun, 1996). 
 
The adjustment to sustained changes in economic conditions was also examined using 
procedures described above. The results (not shown) again indicate that a sustained rise in 
joblessness generally leads to temporary reductions in predicted drinking participation or 
alcohol-involved driving but persistent decreases in conditional drinking and heavy alcohol use. 
 
 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
This investigation uses microdata to confirm that drinking decreases in bad economic times and 
expands on previous analyses by providing three new findings. First, almost all of the procyclical 
variation is due to changes in the consumption of existing drinkers with, at most, short-lasting 
movements into or out of alcohol use. Second, the decrease in alcohol use during downturns is 
concentrated among heavy rather than recreational drinkers. Since heavy use is associated with 
alcohol problems and light drinking may yield health benefits, these results provide strong 
evidence that alcohol abuse is procyclical. Third, the macroeconomic responses tend to be 
relatively similar across demographic categories but with relatively large cyclical fluctuations 
observed for groups with high average levels of drinking and for Hispanics. There is also 
suggestive evidence that recent job losers, as well as those remaining employed, cut their 
consumption when the economy deteriorates. 
 
One caveat deserving mention is that this analysis covers a relatively limited time span. 
Although the 13 years period is longer than that in previous research using microdata, it includes 
just one national turning point (the early-1990s). For this reason, we focus on state-level 
variations in economic conditions and show that our results are consistent with those of prior 
analyses of aggregate data. 
 
The findings have important implications. While we cannot rule out the possibility that the stress 
of a deteriorating economy causes some individuals to self-medicate by increasing alcohol use, 
any such effect is more than offset by broader reductions in drinking. One reason for the fall in 
consumption is that incomes decline. It is, therefore, not surprising that the decrease is 
concentrated among heavy drinkers, who spend the most on liquor. Nevertheless, it is 
noteworthy that this apparently dominates any resistance to decreasing consumption due to the 
potentially addictive nature of substantial alcohol use. 
 
 
The failure to adequately account for the macroeconomic environment could also result in biased 
estimates of the social costs of alcohol problems calculated using data from a single point in 
time. For instance, one frequently cited study concludes that alcohol abuse cost the US$ 148 
billion in 1992 (US Department of Health and Human Services, 1998). However, given the weak 
economy in that year (e.g. the unemployment rate was 7.5%), these figures may understate the 
expenses in more robust periods, such as the middle and late-1990s.
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